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Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent:
A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's
Advocacy in the VMI Case
BY MICHAEL FROST*
D espite an apparently inexhaustible interest in systematic analysis
of judicial opinions, legal scholars usually overlook the most
comprehensive, adaptable, and practical analysis of legal discourse ever
devised: the classical art of rhetoric. Beginning with Aristotle's Rhetoric
and culminating with Cicero's De Oratore and Quintilian's Institutio
Oratoria, Greek and Roman rhetoricians analyzed and described rhetorical
techniques that enabled ordinary Greek and Roman citizens to make
successful legal arguments without the help of lawyers or legal training.
Regrettably, most lawyers and legal scholars are unfamiliar with
classical rhetoric, which is unfortunate because Greco-Roman analysis of
legal reasoning, methodology, and strategy is the foundation and source for
most modem theories on the topic. Classical rhetoric offers detailed and
practical advice on how to devise and present legal arguments and is
especially useful to anyone interested in connections between the law and
other academic disciplines.
Although classical rhetoric has been largely neglected by legal
scholars, it has become increasingly important in the past twenty years in
other academic disciplines. Scholars in departments of English, Composi-
tion, Speech, and, of course, Rhetoric are returning to Greco-Roman
sources for both inspiration and instruction in discourse analysis. In the past
few years, dozens of books and articles have been written on the connec-
tions between modem and classical rhetorical principles.'
Professor of Legal Writing, Southwestern University. Ph.D. 1984, State
University of New York; B.A. 1967, University of California, Davis. Copyright ©
2002. I wish to thank Professors James Kushner and Myrna Raeder for their
helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article.
' Recent scholarship on the connections between modem and classical rhetor-
ical principles includes: A SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC (James J.
Murphy ed., 1983); A SHORTHISTORY OF WRITING INSTRUCTION (James J. Murphy
ed., 1990); LEARNING FROMTHEHISTORIES OFRHETORIC (Theresa Enos ed., 1993);
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None of them, however, focuses exclusively on legal rhetoric and most
barely mention the topic. Even so, a few legal scholars, judges, and lawyers
have recently begun to correct this omission. They recognize the value of
classical rhetoric and occasionally rely on it to clarify or illustrate their
points. They also recognize that, with some adaptations for modem taste
and modem legal practice, the rhetorical principles created by Aristotle,
Cicero, and Quintilian are as applicable today as they were 2500 years ago.
Moreover, the classical approaches provide what most modem approaches
lack: a clear, experience-based theoretical framework for analyzing and
creating legal arguments.
Although modem legal scholars rarely devote much attention to how
classical rhetoric applies to modem judicial discourse, one exception is
Chaim Perelman, a widely respected, law-trained Belgian philosopher. His
The Idea ofJustice and the Problem ofArgument ("The Idea ofJustice"),2
analyzes judicial uses of legal precedent in order to illuminate connections
between classical and modem methods of legal argument. Perelman's The
Idea of Justice, and his The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argument3
emphasize, in ways that are reminiscent of the classical techniques of legal
argument, modes of "nonformal logic which [can] 'induce or increase the
mind's adherence to theses presented for its assent."' 4
In addition to Perelman, other legal scholars, lawyers, and judges have
begun using classical rhetorical principles to analyze legal discourse. For
example, Robert F. Hanley recommends that lawyers take into account the
classical concepts of ethos (an advocate's credibility) and pathos (the
emotional aspects of a legal argument) when planning courtroom argumen-
tative strategies.5 In his treatise on legal logic, Judge Ruggero Aldisert
applies the classical rhetorical concept of enthymetic proofs to modem
legal arguments.6 Judge Richard Posner's treatise on law and literature
BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENSE OF RHETORIC (1988); KATHLEEN E. WELCH, THE
CONTEMPORARY RECEPTION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC: APPROPRIATIONS OF
ANCIENT DISCOURSE (1990); RICHARD MCKEON, RHETORIC: ESSAYS IN INVENTION
AND DISCOVERY (1987).
2 CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT
(John Petrie trans., 1963).
3 CHAIM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENT (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969).
4 EDWARD P.J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT
629 (2d ed. 1971).
5 See Robert F. Hanley, Brush Up Your Aristotle, 12 LITIG. 39 (1986).
6 An enthymeme is a syllogism in which the major premise is only probable,
CORBETT, supra note 4, at 73; or a syllogism in which one term is omitted,
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING
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contains a section on judicial "style as persuasion" where he notes that "[i]t
is an open question whether the style of judicial opinions is better studied
from the standpoint of linguistics and rhetoric or from that of literary
criticism ... ." Professors Anthony G. Amsterdam and Randy Hertz's
analysis of the rhetorical structure of closing arguments includes quotations
from Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian.'
Most of these commentators are interested in how classical rhetorical
principles help discover or explain the internal logic and persuasive value
of legal discourse. Understandably, given their limited purposes, these
commentators rarely call much attention to the larger context from which
these classical principles were drawn. That is, they apply the classical
principles without referring to the overall classical system, in part because
they do not need to. As experienced lawyers and judges, they can rely on
their own experience for much of the information and advice contained in
the classical sources.
Even so, their analyses could certainly benefit from a greater familiarity
with the comprehensive, coherent, and experience-tested classical system,
which offers detailed advice for handling a legal case from the initial issue
and fact determinations to the final courtroom techniques and strategies.
Rhetoric has always been an educational tool geared to meet the practical
demands of the legal profession. For 2500 years, it has survived and
adapted to those demands and can certainly still do so.
Some of these adaptations have already been noted in a series of
articles that analyze the connections between classical rhetoric and modem
practice." Set in the larger context of the entire classical rhetorical system,
54(1989).
7 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
270-71 (1988) (emphasis added). In addition, Posner observes:
[a]s used by Aristotle and his successors, "rhetoric" ran the gamut of
persuasive devices in communication, excluding formal logic. It thus
embraced not only style but much of reasoning. Since the Middle Ages the
word has come more and more to mean just the eloquent or effective use of
language, and that is the approximate sense in which I shall use the word
"style." The broader signification of "rhetoric" has its adherents, though.
Id.
8 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments
to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 55, 60 (1992).
9 Michael Frost, BriefRhetoric-A Note on Classical and Modern Theories of
Forensic Discourse, 38 KAN. L. REV. 411 (1990) [hereinafter Frost, Brief
Rhetoric]; Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REv. 85
(1994) [hereinafter Frost, Ethos, Pathos & LegalAudience]; Michael Frost, Greco-
Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING
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the aforementioned articles examine modem applications of the classical
topics of invention or discovery,1" factual analysis, argumentative
strategies, legal reasoning, organizational patterns, audience analysis,
stylistic conventions, and lawyer credibility. While these articles provide
a starting point for an understanding of how classical rhetoric can benefit
modem legal scholars, they are only a beginning. What is also needed is a
demonstration of how the classical approach deepens our understanding of
the rhetorical forces at play in judicial opinions.
In modem parlance, "rhetoric" is usually a pejorative term, frequently
associated with politicians, preachers, and other public figures. Rhetoric
may be defined as "[language that is elaborate, pretentious, insincere, or
intellectually vacuous."" In this sense, "rhetoric" is a term of opprobrium
reserved for those whose opinions are unpopular or controversial. This
pejorative use of the term is frequently invoked by those who disagree with
the written opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia."
Those who approve of his opinions use a different definition. For them,
rhetoric is "[s]kill in using language effectively and persuasively."' 3
Classical rhetoricians focused most of their attention on this second view
of rhetoric, but they too were acutely aware that over-elaborate, pretentious,
and insincere language impairs the quality of any legal argument.
Most discussions of Justice Scalia's rhetoric are prompted by his
dissenting opinions because that is where his use of patently "rhetorical"
language is most noticeable. A recent sampling of his quotable language
appears in his dissent in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,4 where he criticizes the
INST. 113 (1996) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric
Reasoning]; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman LegalAnalysis: The Topics oflnvention,
66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 107 (1992) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman Legal
Analysis].
'0 See generally Richard J. Schoeck, The Practical Tradition of Classical
Rhetoric, in RHETORIC AND PRAXIS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC
TO PRACTICAL REASONING 28 n.3 (Jean Dietz Moss ed., 1986) ("It is a token of the
lastingness of the symbiotic relation between law and rhetoric that in most Anglo-
American jurisdictions discovery has meant... that early stage in the examination
of evidence by parties to action at law, or their attorneys .....
"AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1494 (4th ed. 2000).
'2 Alex Kozinski, MyPizza with Nino, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1991)
("Scalia's dissents have been labelled 'verbal hand grenades' and rightfully so.
They are explosive. And, like hand grenades, they throw shrapnel at anyone near
the blast without attention to who they are--or how they might vote in the next
case.").
13 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 11.
14 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 692 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court's decision to allow disabled golfer Casey Martin to use a golf cart
during professional tournaments. In that dissent, he contemptuously refers
to the Court's creation of "federal-Platonic golf" 5 and to its "Kajkaesque
determination,"' 6 its "Alice in Wonderland determination,"'7 and its
"Animal Farm determination."' 8 This is the type of language that attracts
public attention.
Justice Scalia's skill as a rhetorician consists of more than his ability
to find and employ a quotable phrase. To demonstrate the important part
rhetoric frequently plays in modem judicial opinions and why it is useful
to analyze judicial opinions from a classical perspective, the following
analysis examines Justice Scalia's dissent in the case of United States v.
Virginia. 9
In the course of his dissent in United States v. Virginia," Justice
Antonin Scalia criticizes the Court's opinion in language that makes his
authorial voice the most distinctive on the U.S. Supreme Court. As he
attacks the majority's decision to require, on equal protection grounds, the
previously all-male Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") to admit qualified
women,2 he accuses the majority of being "illiberal, 22 "counter-
majoritarian,"23 and "self-righteous."'24 He asserts that the majority's equal
protection jurisprudence is random,25 that the Court "load[s] the dice ' 26 or
plays "Supreme Court peek-a-boo' 27 with the standards of review it applies,
that it engages in "politics-smuggled-into-law 21 and "do-it-yourself...
factfinding, ' 29 that it re-writes the U.S. Constitution with "custom-built
'tests,' "30 and "ad-hocery, ' and that it employs "fanciful description[s]
'32
"Id. at 701.
I6 d. at 705 (emphasis added).
'1Id. (emphasis added).
'8 Id. (emphasis added).
'9 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 531-34.
22 Id. at 567.
231d.
24Id. at 601.
25 Id. at 567.
26 Id. at 568.
27 Id. at 574.
2 1 Id. at 569.
29 Id. at 589 n.5.
30 Id. at 570.
31 Id. at 600.32Id. at 571.
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of its own decisions. Language like this has gained Justice Scalia a well-
deserved reputation for being a caustic and frequently sarcastic stylist.33
Much of his reputation arises from the language he uses when he is the
sole dissenter. When he writes for the majority, his language is more formal
and less controversial. In large part the language differences between
Justice Scalia's dissents and his majority opinions arise from the fact that
majority opinions are "corporate" or collaborative writing, that is, writing-
by-committee. Although the assigned Justice has considerable stylistic
latitude in organizing and writing the opinion, the other Justices make both
substantive and stylistic contributions.34 The effect of these contributions
is usually to dilute the personal writing style of the official author and to
produce an opinion with no distinctive authorial voice. Moreover, most
judges strive for an objective writing style that subordinates their personal
voice to ensure that the opinion appears as impartial as possible.35
" See Kozinski, supra note 12, at 1586; Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371,
1383 (1995) ("Regular dissenters such as Justice Scalia are particularly prone to
stylish stabs.") (emphasis added). See also Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk,
Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson, Role [Imjmorality, and the
Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 28-29 nn.129, 131 (2000)
(asserting that "Scalia's dissent in Dickerson III is... hyperbolic" and that "its
assertion of intellectual superiority is offensive").
34 See generally JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 186
(3d ed. 1993) ("In writing an opinion, the writingjudge is involved in ajoint venture.
The end product is not his opinion alone but rather that of all the members of the panel
who form the majority.... Like the trial court decision, it is written by one judge.
However, suggested revisions are made by the other participating judges and the
opinion is a shared effort." (emphasis added)); BERNARD E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON
APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 83 (1977) ("In cases of exceptionally fine work, the
responsive notes [of other judges] may be very enthusiastic. On the other hand, a
Justice may disagree with major details of an opinion, and the result may be
considerable revision or sharpening as the opinion goes through draft after draft to
accommodate all of the suggestions. The writing judge may make extensive conces-
sions either to keep his majority or to get as close to unanimity as possible." (quoting
JOHN P. FRANK, THE MARBLE PALACE 119 (1958))); Wald, supra note 33, at 1377
("[M]ost judges will compromise their preferred rationale and rhetoric to gain a full
concurrence from other members of the panel. In an appellate court composed of
strong-minded men and women of different political and personal philosophies,
consensus is a formidable constraint on what an opinion writer says and how she says
it. Her best lines are often left on the cutting room floor." (emphasis added)).
" Judge Joyce George, former judge of the Ohio Court of Appeals, stresses the
need for objectivity. See GEORGE, supra note 34, at 422 ("The individual technique
used by the writer to express the decision made, as well as the reasons for the
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Dissents are a different matter. As a rule, dissenters are unhappy. After
all, they have not persuaded their colleagues to their point of view.36 They
are unhappy about the majority's ruling, unhappy about its rationale,
unhappy about its reading of the facts, treatment of the record, or under-
standing of the law. Consequently, they dissent. In their unhappiness, they
use their dissents for sometimes questionable purposes and do so in the face
of widespread skepticism about the usefulness or advisability of dissents
generally.
As Bernard E. Witkin observes in his Manual on Appellate Court
Opinions," "[t]he proponents and opponents of dissenting opinions are
about evenly divided in number and in vehemence of their opinions on the
subject."38 Professor Witkin quotes numerous judges who offer two primary
justifications for writing a dissent: they preserve legal principles for use at
a later time, and they may prompt a court, on reflection, to correct its
errors.
39
In her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook," Judge Joyce George,
formerly of the Ohio Court of Appeals, maintains that "[a] dissent should
be aimed at serving the law by raising unanswered issues and theories that
more appropriately control the particular case. They may be used to guide
a future court by suggesting the evolution of legal principles necessary to
meet changed social conditions and concepts."4' She cautions that a dissent,
"depending upon its tone... may give the appearance of the existence of
dissension among the members of the bench."'42
As a rule, then, dissenters want to demonstrate that the majority was
wrong to rule as it did. Frequently, they use the dissent to continue a debate
on controversial topics or to test new (or old) ideas in the court of public
opinion. Sometimes the dissent is intended to spur legislative action.43
decision, should be neutral, detached, objective, and impersonal." (emphasis
added)).
36 Judge Patricia Wald, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C.
Cir.), makes this point that "[a] dissenter is admitting she has not been able to
convince her colleagues ... ." Wald, supra note 33, at 1412.
31 WrrIN, supra note 34.
31 Id. at 225.
391 Id. at 226-27.
40 GEORGE, supra note 34.
41 Id. at 224.
42Id.
43 Wald, supra note 33, at 1412 ("A dissent speaks to the rest of the court, to
courts in other places, to higher courts, to Congress, to future generations; it brings
no hope ofpresent reward or vindication." (emphasis added)).
2002-2003]
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Judges who think writing dissents is a bad idea give a number of
reasons, such as fostering resentment in the losing party, encouraging
unnecessary appeals, and introducing uncertainty into the judicial process."
Some judges, Justice Scalia among them, use their dissents to publicly
rebuke their colleagues or to provide a parade of horribles that will
inevitably flow from the ruling. Occasionally, a dissent functions as a sort
of therapeutic venting for the unhappy judge.45 In that sort of dissent:
He [the dissenting judge] sometimes may indulge in sarcasm and far-fetched
logic, unreasonable constructions and interpretations ... In some few cases
personalities enter into it.... He wants to make his view stand out in bold
relief, and by undue emphasis, unreasonable criticism, unfair interpretation,
and a failure to follow the record he affords by his dissent much that makes
good reading in the press, all to the harm of the court as a whole.46
Judge George echoes these sentiments when she insists that "[t]he
dissenter should not personally attack the majority. The reasons compelling
the dissent should be expressed clearly without intemperance, insinuations,
or allegations of incompetence. '
No matter what their purpose, dissenting judges--especially rhetori-
cally sophisticated judges like Scalia-have a stylistic latitude that
collaborative writers do not. Unalloyed by the substantive and stylistic
contributions of other judges, the personal authorial voice of the dissenting
judge emerges, undiluted by the voices of collaborators. 4 Frequently this
allows the judge's personality, or at least his or her judicial persona, to
become much more visible and this in turn affects how the dissent is read.49
"WrrKIN, supra note 34, at 226 ("My own view, however, is that most dissents
do much more harm than good. They foster resentment on the part of the losing
party, they encourage groundless appeals and they introduce an element of
uncertainty where certainty should if possible prevail.") (quoting Judge John J.
Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13 (1950)).
4" See generally GEORGE, supra note 34, at 223 ("The dissenter should not
attack the majority. The reasons compelling the dissent should be expressed clearly
without intemprance, insinuations, or allegations of incompetence.").
' WmIN, supra note 34, at 226-27 (quoting Herbert B. Gregory, Shorter
Judicial Opinions, 34 VA. L. REv. 362, 366 (1948)).
47 GEORGE, supra note 34, at 223.
48 Wald, supra note 33, at 1413 ("A dissent is liberating. No other judge need
agree or even be consulted. Exuberant (or excess) prose is unconstrained.").
49 Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1421, 1436 (1995) ("A [judicial] writing has an implied author (a
"voice" in a sense that goes beyond signature) as well as an actual author. The
[VOL. 91
JUSTICE SCALIA'S RHETORIC OF DISSENT
Not only does this judicial persona become visible, it is also trans-
formed in character. In one sense, the dissenting judge becomes an
advocate as well as a judge. Despite repeated admonitions not to, judges
sometimes become advocates. "A judge is not an advocate in robes. The
judge may not extend his judicial activities so as to become, in effect, either
an assisting prosecutor, an assisting defense attorney or a thirteenth juror.
Nor should the judge's individual biases, values or morals be imposed upon
others."'50
Unlike typical advocates, however, the dissenter is not addressing a
court (or at least not his or her own court). The dissenter has already lost
that battle. Instead, dissenting judges aim their arguments at other
audiences. 51 In the hope of influencing them and prompting them to action,
dissenting judges write for other courts, and for legislative bodies, legal
commentators, the media, and the general public. As judicial advocates,
dissenting judges furnish these audiences with arguments, authorities, and,
presumably, a rhetorical vocabulary for re-addressing the issues.
The success of these judicial advocates depends, of course, on the
merits of their substantive arguments. Most commentators who review
Scalia's dissents correctly focus on the substantive merits of his reasoning.
After all, if he is illogical, misuses authorities, misreads the record, or
otherwise compromises the integrity of his analysis, then his colleagues on
the Court rightly rejected his point of view. But Justice Scalia is highly
intelligent, resourceful, and experienced. Even his critics concede these
attributes; however, successful arguments depend on more than substantive
merit. They also depend on the advocate's credibility and the emotions he
or she invokes, both of which are substantially affected by the advocate's
writing style.
While the affective or emotive aspects of Scalia's opinions have
received considerable attention, this attention usually focuses on revealing
or objectionable word choices or phrases--that is, his diction.52 Even while
implied author is the author whose character and values we infer from the writing
itself, as distinct from the character and values that we might infer from a personal
acquaintanceship with the author or from-a good biography of him." (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
5o See GEORGE, supra note 34, at 421. See also WITKIN, supra note 34, at 233
("Some commentators have therefore cautioned against taking the position of an
advocate in an attack on the majority opinion or its authors." (emphasis added)).
51 See Wald, supra note 33, at 1412 ("A dissent speaks to the rest of the court,
to courts in other places, to higher courts, to Congress, to future generations...").
52 One recent exception to this general approach appears in Fajans & Falk,
supra note 33. The authors analyze the rhetoric of the Court's opinion as well as
some of Justice Scalia's dissent.
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decrying his aggressive tone and vocabulary as unnecessarily personal and
sometimes cruel, commentators still devote most of their analysis to the
substantive merits of his arguments and insufficiently analyze several
important rhetorical forces at play when Justice Scalia, the Advocate,
writes his dissents. These other rhetorical cross-currents are best examined
in light of analytical techniques first formulated over 2000 years ago.
I. GRECO-ROMAN RHETORIC
Rhetorical analysis of legal discourse dates to the time of Aristotle,
whose Rhetoric3 is the most famous and most influential, if not the
earliest54 or most complete," description of forensic rhetorical technique.
In its Aristotelian sense, rhetoric is the "faculty [power] of discovering in
the particular case what are the available means of persuasion."56 Aris-
totle's Rhetoric was the model for Roman rhetoricians like Cicero57 and
Quintilian,58 who expanded on Aristotle's work to create the most
comprehensive analysis of legal discourse in existence.
Basing their work on close observation of successful advocates,
Aristotle and the others examined, in exhaustive detail, all the methods that
53 ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE (Lane Cooper trans., 1932).
" Corax of Syracuse is generally credited with inventing rhetoric in the fifth
century B.C. None of Corax's handbooks on rhetoric have survived, although
"[tihere are references in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian to the part that
Corax ... played in formulating rhetorical theory ...... CORBETT, supra note 4, at
595. See also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND
SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 8 (1980). Kennedy also
observes that "Corax and Tisias... are traditionally described as 'inventors' of
rhetoric." Id.
5' The most comprehensive treatment is that of Marcus Fabius Quintilian
whose Institutio Oratoria covers the topic in four volumes, which are subdivided
into twelve books. See Roland Gregory Austin & Michael Winterbottom,
Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilinnus), in THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY
1290 (Simon Homblower & Antony Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 1996).
56 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 7.
57 Marcus Tullius Cicero (circa 106-45 B.C.) was a Roman statesman, lawyer,
and teacher whose major works on rhetoric include De Oratore and Brutus. See
John Hedley Simon & Dirk Obbink, Marcus Tullius Cicero, in THE OXFORD
CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 1558-64 (Simon Homblower & Antony Spawforth eds.,
3d ed. 1996).
" Marcus Fabius Quintilian (circa 35-95 A.D.) was a Roman teacher of public
speaking and rhetoric whose major work on rhetoric is Institutio Oratoria. See
Austin & Michael, supra note 55, at 1290.
[VOL. 91
JUSTICE SCALIA'S RHETORIC OF DISSENT
experienced advocates used to create and present their arguments.59 In
doing so, they emphasized practical, experience-based methodologies for
achieving rhetorical success. Most of them divided the practice of rhetoric
into five parts: invention (discovery of available arguments),' arrangement
(organization of those arguments),6 style (presentation of those arguments),
memory, and delivery. Most of their attention is focused on style.62 They
connected style, as well as the other aspects of rhetoric, to three modes of
persuasion: arguments based on logic (logos), arguments based on emotion
(pathos), and arguments based on the advocate's character or credibility
(ethos).63
According to classical rhetoricians, successful advocacy depends on a
careful mix of all three modes, each complementing the others. In their
view, the logical integrity of an argument will be seriously damaged if
advocates lack credibility or fail to control the emotional cross-currents of
their case. Good advocates employ all three modes simultaneously.
Analysis of Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Virginia'4 using
Greco-Roman techniques reveals that he is a sophisticated, but frequently
heavy-handed, rhetorician. He uses the time-honored rhetorical devices of
metaphor, simile, antithesis, irony, hyperbole, and rhetorical questions in
9 For a more complete discussion of the history and development of classical
rhetoric as it applies to modem legal discourse see Michael Frost, Introduction to
Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613 (1999).
o For further discussion of this topic as it applies to modem legal discourse see
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra note 9.
61Extensive coverage of organization as a rhetorical strategy appears in Michael
Frost, Brief Rhetoric, supra note 9.
62 3 QUWTIL1AN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 185 (H.E. Butler trans., 1996) ("There-
fore it is on this [style] that teachers of rhetoric concentrate their attention, since
it cannot possibly be acquired without the assistance of the rules of art: it is this
which is the chief object of our study, the goal of all our exercises and all our
efforts at imitation, and it is to this that we devote the energies of a lifetime; it is
this that makes one orator surpass his rivals, this that makes one style of speaking
preferable to another." (emphasis added)).
63 Classical rhetoricians created these divisions for purposes of analysis and
discussion, but did not consider logos, pathos, and ethos as completely separable
from one another. Each part is connected to and helps define the others.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 8. For an extended discussion of the part ethos plays
in modem legal discourse see Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note
9. See also 1 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 397 ("There are... three aims which
the orator must always have in view; he must instruct, move and charm his
hearers.").
" United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ways that damage, rather than enhance, his arguments. In the course of his
dissent, he uses these devices and others explicitly to disdain his colleagues
and the Court's review procedures. Moreover, he undermines his own
arguments by adopting a disagreeable and frequently peevish judicial
persona who appears alternately indifferent or hostile to the important
emotional cross-currents moving through the case.
II. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA,
A. The Majority Opinion
The target of Justice Scalia's dissent is the majority opinion, which
addressed two questions. First, the majority assessed whether "Virginia's
exclusion of women from the educational opportunities provided by
VMI-extraordinary opportunities for military training and civilian
leadership development-[denies] women 'capable of all the individual
activities required of VMI cadets,' the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."65 Second, it examined "if
VMI's 'unique' situation-as Virginia's sole single-sex public institution
of higher education-offends the Constitution's equal protection principle,
what is the remedial requirement?" 66
Relying on its previous decisions in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.67 and
Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan,8 the Court required "[p]arties
who seek to defend gender-based government action [to] demonstrate an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action."69 This justification
must show "that the [challenged] classification serves 'important govern-
mental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are
'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' "70 While
noting that inherent differences between the sexes may justify sex
classifications in some cases,7 the Court added that "such classifications
may not be used.., to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women."72
6 Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
66 Id. at 530-31 (citation omitted).67 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
68 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
69 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).
7oId. at 533.
Id. at 532.72Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
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The Court rejected both of Virginia's justifications for a male-only
admission policy at VMI. Virginia had asserted: (1) that "'single-sex
education provides important educational benefits"' and "contributes to
'diversity of educational approaches;"' and (2) that "'the unique VMI
method-of character development and leadership training,' the school's
adversative approach, would have to be modified were VMI to admit
women."7 3 Its examination ofVMI' s past and recent history74 convinced the
Court that VMI was not created or maintained to promote "diversifying...
educational opportunities within the Commonwealth."75
As for Virginia's second argument "that VMI's adversative method of
training provides educational benefits that cannot be made available,
unmodified, to women,"76 the Court noted that similar rationales have been
offered in the past to deny women educational opportunities in law,77
medicine,78 law enforcement,79 and federal military academies."0 The Court
concluded that some women are as able as men to meet the challenge of
VMI's"adversative" educational method, and that VlMl's goal ofproducing
"'citizen-soldier[s] ""' is "great enough to accommodate women. 82
The Court also rejected Virginia's remedial plan, finding that Virginia
"chose not to eliminate, but to leave untouched, VMI's exclusionary
policy"8' 3 and, instead, "proposed a separate program, different in kind from
VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible facilities,"8'4 thereby failing to
meet its obligation to "'eliminate [so far as possible] the discriminatory
effects of the past"' and to "'bar like discrimination in the future."'8 5 At
great length, the Court criticized Virginia's proposal to establish Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), a four year, state-sponsored
undergraduate program located at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal
arts school for women. 6 It found that "VWlL's student body, faculty,
13 Id. at 535.
74 Id. at 536-38.
11 Id. at 535.76 Id. at 540.
"Id. at 543-44.
7 Id. at 544.
79 Id.
s1 Id. at 544-45.
s11 d. at 545.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 547.
84 Id.
85Id. (citation omitted).
6 d. at 526-27.
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course offerings, and facilities hardly match VMI's. Nor can the VWIL
graduate anticipate the benefits associated with VMI's 157-year history, the
school's prestige, and its influential alumni network."87 The Court
concluded that "Virginia's remedy affords no cure at all for the opportuni-
ties and advantages withheld from women who want a VMI education and
can make the grade,"88 and that "the Commonwealth has shown no
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for withholding from women
qualified for the experience premier training of the kind VMI affords."89
B. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia's dissent claims that there are numerous flaws in the
Court's decision.9" According to Justice Scalia, the Court mistakenly
removed decisions regarding the educational process from the democratic
process, "inscrib[ed]" them into the U.S. Constitution,9 and rejected a
"'long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use [of male-only
admissions to VI] that dates back to the beginning of the Republic.' "92
He further claimed that it "contradict[ed]"93 and abandoned the previously
employed intermediate scrutiny standard in sex-classification cases,94 and
applied instead an "amorphous 'exceedingly persuasive justification"' 95
standard that "amounts to (at least) strict scrutiny. 96
In advocating Virginia's argument that a male-only VMI supports the
state's interest in promoting educational diversity, Justice Scalia notes that
the record contains a "'substantial body of contemporary scholarship and
research [that] supports the proposition that, although males and females
have significant areas of developmental overlap, they also have differing
developmental needs that are deep-seated. "'97 He adds that VMI, like all
other self-interested and autonomous colleges in Virginia, unavoidably
contributes to the diversity of educational opportunities in the state.98
871d. at 551.
18 Id. at 555.
89 Id. at 555-56.
" Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 567.
92 Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
931 Id. at 572.
9Id. at 574.95 Id. at 573.
96 Id. at 579.
97 Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
981 Id. at 584.
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As for Virginia's argument that admitting women to VI would
fundamentally alter its "adversative" training method, Justice Scalia
criticizes the Court for rejecting ample evidence supporting that view.99 He
concludes his criticism of the majority opinion by asserting that Virginia's
proposed remedy-establishment of VWIL, a four year, state-sponsored
undergraduate program located at Mary Baldwin College--would
adequately solve the problem.X10 He also criticizes the concurring opinion,
by Justice Rehnquist, for rejecting Virginia's diversity rationale,' °'
asserting that VMI' s "adversative" educational method serves an important
governmental objective,0 2 and for claiming that Virginia did not react
quickly enough to Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting single-sex
public educational institutions. 13
Having criticized the reasoning of both the majority and the concur-
rence, Scalia devotes the last few pages of his dissent to predicting the
consequences of the majority decision. He is convinced that the decision
"ensures that single-sex public education is functionally dead,"' 14 because
no single-sex public institution will be able to provide the Court's
"'exceedingly persuasive justification.'""05 Not only that, but "[t]he
potential of today's decision for widespread disruption of existing
institutions lies in its application to private single-sex education."'0 6 He
concludes by suggesting that the Court's decision was unprincipled in
ignoring its own precedents and in self-righteously imposing "its own
favored social and economic dispositions nationwide."'0 7
While the foregoing summary of the logical grounds (or logos) of
Justice Scalia's dissent identifies his main arguments, it falls far short of
capturing the tone and spirit of that dissent. Scalia's main arguments are
hardly novel-judicial encroachment on democratic processes, failure to
honor traditional practices, inexplicable and unclear shifts in the standard
of review, and refusal to properly weigh the evidentiary record; all are
commonplace criticisms frequently levied by Court critics. What are novel,
or at least distinctive, are the rhetorical strategies that Justice Scalia
employs to make his points. Examination of those strategies, using the
91Id. at 585.
'ooId. at 590-91.
'o' Id. at 592-93.
Io2 d. at 593-94.
03Id. at 594-95.
'o4 Id. at 596.
10 Id. at 597.
106 Id. at 598.
'07 Id. at 601.
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Greco-Roman approach to analyzing legal discourse, clarifies the rhetorical
impact of Scalia's stylistic choices.
I. EMOTION AND ARGUMENT
Even a casual examination of Justice Scalia's dissent reveals that he
feels passionately about the case. His opening lines excoriate the Court for
a multitude of errors. Scalia's decision to begin in this highly emotional
fashion is a well-established rhetorical practice approved of by Aristotle,
Cicero, and Quintilian, who were acutely conscious of organizational
strategies in argument. They divided legal arguments into five parts:
introduction (exordium), statement of the case (narratio), argument
summary (partitio), proof of the case (confirmatio) and conclusion
(peroratio).'8 Each part had a specific rhetorical function to fulfill.
A. Exordium
Aristotle stated that the purpose of the exordium, or introduction, is to
make the "audience receptive."' 9 He and the other rhetoricians knew that
logic alone is not enough. Good advocates must also ensure that their
audiences are emotionally engaged and they must do so at the beginning of
their arguments. Cicero, for example, stressed that it is "essential that [the
exordium] should have the power of being able to exert... influence in
stirring the minds of audience... [because it has] a very great effect in
persuading and arousing emotion .... ."'0 Like Cicero, Quintilian thought
the exordium exercised a "valuable influence in winning the judge [or
audience] to regard us with favor."'"
The ringing cadences of Scalia's opening paragraph are certainly an
attempt to create a sense of outrage in his audience:
108 For a detailed discussion of the topic of arrangement in legal discourse see
Frost, Brief Rhetoric, supra note 9, at 411.
'0' ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 223-24.
110 3 CICERO, DE ORATORE 435 (H. Rackhan trans., 2001). See also id. at 325
("[M]en decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or
joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or
authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute.").
"' 2 QUINILIAN, supra note 62, at 19. See also 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62,
at 181 ("while emotional appeals are concerned with moving the audience and,
although they may be employed throughout the case, are most effective at the
beginning and end." (emphasis added)).
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Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people
of the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a
century and a half. To achieve that desired result, it rejects (contrary to
our established practice) the factual findings . ..sweeps aside the
precedents of this Court, and ignores the history of our people. As to
facts: It explicitly rejects the finding that there exist "gender-based
developmental differences" supporting Virginia's restriction of the
"adversative" method to only a men's institution, and the finding that the
all-male composition of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is essential
to that institution's character As to precedent: It drastically revises our
established standards for reviewing sex-based classifications. And as to
history: It counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the
present, of men's military colleges supported by both States and the
Federal Government." 2
With this introduction, Justice Scalia announces his main substantive
themes in language designed to touch readers emotionally. Couching his
position in absolute terms, he asserts that the Court's decision will "shut
down' " 3 a venerable institution, that it "rejects""' 4 findings, "sweeps
aside""' precedents, and "counts for nothing""' 6 the long traditions of
men's military colleges. These particular verb choices suggest that Justice
Scalia is writing as an emotionally invested advocate-not as an objective,
disinterested Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The magnitude of Justice
Scalia's emotional investment in this case becomes very clear when this
opening paragraph is compared with openings in those dissents not geared
toward generating an emotional response.' 17
12 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
113Id.
114Id.
115 Id.
116 id.
"7 For examples of Justice Scalia's dissents that employ low-key, non-emo-
tional opening paragraphs, see Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (a standard of review case); and Saratoga Fishing Co. v.
J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 885-86 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (a
products liability case). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (an Equal Protection case) (Justice Scalia opens his dissent with
"The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite"); and J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156-57 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (an Equal
Protection case) (where Justice Scalia opens with "Today's opinion is an inspiring
demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in
matters pertaining to the sexes (or as the Court would have it, the genders), and
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Not only does this opening paragraph help set the emotional tone of the
dissent, it also concisely summarizes Scalia's main reasons for dissenting.
This, too, is a time-honored practice that Greco-Roman rhetoricians called
partitio.
B. Partitio
The purpose of the partitio, according to anonymous author of the Ad
C. Herennium, is to "set... forth, briefly and completely, the points we
intend to discuss.""' More than that, however, the partitio is designed,
according to Quintilian:
[To add] to the lucidity and grace of our speech. For it not only makes our
arguments clearer by isolating the points from the crowd in which they
would otherwise be lost and placing them before the eyes of the judge [or
audience], but relieves his attention by assigning a definite limit to certain
parts of our speech, just as our fatigue upon a journey is relieved by
reading the distances on the milestones which we pass.' 19
That is, although good advocates must keep the audience's needs in
mind at every stage of their argument, they must be especially mindful of
how they begin. An audience's emotional receptivity to an argument is
affected in part by the advocate's word choice, but it is also affected by the
complexity and duration of the argument.
A properly constructed partitio reassures the audience that the
forthcoming arguments will be easy to understand and of a manageable
length. Scalia's opening paragraph meets the classical criteria of making
the magnitude of the task clear from the outset and attempting favorably to
dispose the audience to the forthcoming arguments by identifying three
main lines of argument---arguments based on facts, arguments based on
precedent, and arguments based on history."0
C. Parallel Structure
In his exordium, Scalia employs still another classical rhetorical
strategy-parallel construction. Consciously or not, he uses a stylistic
how sternly we disapprove the male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors.").
118 1 AD C. HERENNIUM 31 (Harry Caplan trans., 1989).
119 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 149.
120 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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device that Greco-Roman rhetoricians regarded as closely associated with
forensic discourse. Parallelism, or similitudo, is a general term that
describes both parallelism and antithesis. 2 Parallelism, like other
rhetorical methods, makes arguments felt as well as understood. The
purpose of parallelism is "to attract the attention of the audience and...
not allow it to flag, rousing it from time to time."'' For classical rhetori-
cians, sentence-level stylistic devices are never a merely ornamental feature
of argument. Instead, they are deliberately chosen to clarify or vivify an
argument. On this point, Quintilian makes a number of very specific
recommendations. He suggests that for maximum effect "a number of
clauses may begin with the same word for the sake of force and emphasis,"
or that they "may end with the same words."'2
In keeping with classical practice, Scalia's main arguments are set out
in a series of parallel "as to" phrases: "[a]s to facts,"'24 "[a]s to
precedent,"'125 and "as to history."1 26 His substantive points are that the
Court rejected well-documented evidence ("facts"), 27 revised well-
established standards of review ("precedent"), 2 ' and ignored time-honored
traditions ("history"). 29 The conjunctive "as to" phrases achieve their
emotional force by accretion, each one adding to Justice Scalia' s indictment
of the majority opinion. The parallel phrases help him sustain his emotional
momentum. They have the additional virtue of acting as coherence devices
that unify his argument and make it more comprehensible.
30
As the preceding analysis shows, Justice Scalia's sophisticated
organizational strategies, coupled with emotion-inducing word choices and
121 SeeMARSH H. MCCALL, JR., ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORIES OF SIMILE AND
COMPARISON 67 (1969). See also WINIFRED B. HORNER, RHETORIC IN THE
CLASSICAL TRADITION 312 (1988) (Parallelism expresses similar or related ideas
in similar grammatical construction.).
1 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 461.
123 Id. at 463.
124 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Id.
126 id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129Id.
130 1 AD C. HERENNIUM, supra note 118, at 381, 383 ("A Comparison [can] be
used for vividness, and be set forth in the form of a detailed parallel .... This
Comparison, by embellishing both terms, bringing into relation by a method of
parallel description... set[s] the subject vividly before the eyes of all. Moreover
the Comparison is presented in the form of a detailed parallel because, once the
similitude has been set up, all like elements are related.").
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sentence structures, placehis opening paragraph firmly within the classical
tradition of exordia. His opening paragraph not only provides readers with
a clear picture of the forthcoming substantive arguments, but also sets the
emotional tone for those arguments.
In order to appreciate fully the emotion-inducing rhetorical force of
Justice Scalia's opening paragraph, it should be contrasted with the
comparatively colorless opening paragraph of the majority opinion. Justice
Ginsburg begins her opinion with three simple declarative sentences, none
of them particularly memorable: "Virginia's public institutions of higher
learning include an incomparable military college, Virginia Military
Institute (VMI). The United States maintains that the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men
the unique educational opportunities VMI affords. We agree."'' For
reasons discussed earlier,"3 2 Justice Ginsburg's opening contains none of
the rhetorical flourishes or distinction of Scalia's opening. It is simply a
business-like statement of the Court's decision.
D. Peroration
As significant as the opening exordia are in classical theory, classical
rhetoricians thought the conclusion, orperoratio, was even more important
for controlling emotional responses to the argument. For Aristotle, the
conclusion should "put the audience into the right state of emotion" and
should "make the audience feel the right emotions-pity, indignation,
anger, hatred, envy, emulation, antagonism."'3 Quintilian agreed and
observed that, "[t]he peroration is the most important part of forensic
pleading, and in the main consists of appeals to the emotions.' 34 He too
emphasized that "[t]he peroration provides freer opportunities for exciting
the passions ofjealousy, hatred or anger."' 35 Quintilian recommended that
the opening exordium and the closing peroratio be carefully coordinated:
[I]n our opening any preliminary appeal to the compassion of the judge
[or audience] must be made sparingly and with restraint, while in the
peroration we may give full rein to our emotions, place fictitious speeches
131 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519.
132 See GEORGE, supra note 34, at 422 (decisions should be written in a
"neutral, detached, objective, and impersonal" fashion).
133 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 240.
134 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 417.
135 Id. at 391.
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in the mouths of our characters, call the dead to life, and produce the wife
or children of the accused in court, practices which are less usual in
exordia.
136
Justice Scalia' s concluding paragraphs emphasize his argument that the
Court is ignoring history, and fit the pattern recommended by Quintilian
and others. Even more so than in his opening paragraphs, Justice Scalia's
closing paragraphs are transparently emotional. He does not quite "call the
dead to life,' 137 but he does claim that VII's "attachment to such old-
fashioned concepts as manly 'honor' , 138 has made it a target for those who
want to abolish public single-sex education. To illustrate what will be lost
by that abolition, he quotes amply from VMI's "The Code of a Gentleman":
Without a strict observance of the fundamental Code of Honor, no
man, no matter how 'polished,' can be considered a gentleman. The honor
of a gentleman demands the inviolability of his word, and the incorrupt-
ibility of his principles. He is the descendant of the knight, the crusader;
he is the defender of the defenseless and the champion ofjustice... or he
is not a Gentleman.
39
Scalia then quotes the Code's list of gentlemanly virtues, many of
which concern proper deportment toward "ladies." Gentlemen, for
example, do not gossip about their girlfriends, they do not visit ladies when
they are drunk, call out to them in the street, discuss their "merits or
demerits," or "lay a finger" on them. 4 ' Invoking as he does the image of a
knight errant or religious crusader, Scalia's purpose is obviously to play
on readers' emotions and to create in them a sense of indignation over the
pending "destruction" '' of an institution that encourages "manly honor."'42
136 Id. at 21 (first emphasis added).
137 Id.
.3 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 601 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 602.
140 Id. at 602-03.
141 Id. at 603. Justice Scalia relies on the emotion-laden figure of the knight
errant in another dissent as well. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (an Equal Protection case), Scalia maintains that "[w]hen the
Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the
villeins--and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values
of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn."
142 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rhetorically speaking,
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion attempts a bit more in theperoratio than it did
in its opening. It makes an emotional appeal based on an ever-evolving sense of
constitutional rights. The majority opinion closes as follows:
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Justice Scalia has obviously relied on emotion to strengthen the per-
suasive value of the opening and closing paragraphs of his dissent.
Deliberately or instinctively, he closely adheres to classical advocacy
principles which stress the importance of employing all modes of persua-
sion. While from a rhetorical perspective, Scalia's exordium andperoration
are critical parts of the dissent, they are but two of the many emotion-
inducing rhetorical devices he uses to reinforce his logical points.
Moreover, they exploit rhetorical strategies that depend on the overall
structure of the argument, that is, the rhetorical canon of arrangement or
placement of arguments. Notably, classical rhetoricians regarded sentence-
level rhetorical style as much more important than arrangement in
persuasive value.
E. Style
Classical rhetoricians spent far more time on discussions of rhetorical
style than on any other topic. 43 Aristotle emphasized that "it is not enough
A prime part of the history of our Constitution, historian Richard Morris
recounted, is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and
protections to people once ignored or excluded. VMI's story continued as
our comprehension of "We the People" expanded. There is no reason to
believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required of
VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to
serve the "more perfect Union."
Id. at 557 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Even this example is tame when compared with Justice Scalia's command of the
forceful climatic paragraph. In the recent case of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting), he concludes his dissent, from the majority
opinion allowing disabled golfer Casey Martin to use a golf cart during tournaments,
with the following paragraph,
Complaints about this case are not "properly directed to Congress."
They are properly directed to this Court's Ka/kaesque determination that
professional sports organizations, and the fields they rent for their
exhibitions, are "places ofpublic accommodation" to the competing athletes,
and the athletes themselves "customers" of the organization that pays them;
its Alice in Wonderland determination that there are such things as judicially
determinable "essential" and "nonessential" rules of a made-up game; and
its Animal Farm determination that fairness and the ADA mean that
everyone gets to play by individualized rules which will assure that no one's
lack of ability (or at least no one's lack of ability so pronounced that it
amounts to a disability) will be a handicap. The year was 2001, and
"everybody was finally equal."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
143 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 185 ("Therefore it is on this [style] that
teachers of rhetoric concentrate their attention, since it cannot possibly be acquired
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to know what to say-one must also know how to say it.""' Quintilian
insisted that "oratory in which there is no guile fights by sheer weight and
impetus alone."' 45 By "guile," Quintilian meant an advocate's use of all
available stylistic resources. He also observed that "although it may seem
that proof is infinitesimally affected by thefigures employed, none the less
[sic] those same figures lend credibility to our arguments and steal their
way secretly into the minds of the judges."'46 As the following analysis
demonstrates, no single rhetorical figure or device accounts for the
rhetorical impact of Justice Scalia's dissent. Instead, these devices have a
cumulative effect and into the audience's mind and affect their response to
the substantive arguments.
F. Metaphors and Similes
From a classical perspective, one of the most important of these
stylistic devices was the well-chosen metaphor.'47 Recognizing that all
language is inherently figurative, classical rhetoricians considered
metaphors, 4 ' similes, and other figurative devices as both figures of
thought and figures of speech.'49 Regarding metaphors, Aristotle observed
without the assistance of the rules of art: it is this which is the chief object of our
study, the goal of all our exercises and all our efforts at imitation, and it is to this that
we devote the energies of a lifetime; it is this that makes one orator surpass his rivals,
this that makes one style of speaking preferable to another.").
144 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 182.
14 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 359 (emphasis added).
' Id. (first and last emphases added).
147 For a fuller discussion of metaphors in legal argument see Frost, Greco-
Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, supra note 9.
'"Numerous modem definitions of metaphor exist ranging from Robert Frost's
definition that a metaphor is "saying one thing and meaning another," JAMES B.
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT
AND EXPRESSION 57 (1973), to that of the PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY
AND POETICS 490 (Alex Preminger ed. 1965), which defines metaphor as:
A condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by the
presence of one or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be enhanced in
vividness, complexity, or breadth of implication.
... The metaphorical relation has been variously described as compari-
son, contrast, analogy, similarity, juxtaposition, identity, tension, collision
[and] fusion ....
For a comprehensive study of metaphors in U.S. Supreme Court opinions, see HAIG
BOSMAnAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992).
"9 Metaphors function in the same way as examples do in inductive proofs. See
ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 147-49; 1 CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 89, 91 (H.M.
Hubbell trans., 1949); and 2 QuiNTiLiAN, supra note 62, at 275-76.
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that "we may start from the principle that we all take a naturalpleasure in
learning easily; so, since words stand for things, those words are most
pleasing that give us fresh knowledge .... Accordingly, it is metaphor that
is in the highest degree instructive and pleasing."'50 Both Cicero and
Quintilian also recognized that metaphors, and to a lesser degree similes,
emotionally engage readers even while instructing them.''
In his dissent, Justice Scalia carefully uses metaphors, similes, and
other rhetorical devices to make his points. For example, when rejecting the
Court's conclusion that, as an autonomous university, it was impossible for
VMI to contribute to Virginia's state-wide diversity goals, Scalia observes,
"[i]f it were impossible for individual human beings (or groups of human
beings) to act autonomously in effective pursuit of a common goal, the
game of soccer would not exist."'52 As for the demand in Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence for more evidence that VMI contributes to state-
wide educational diversity, Scalia says that demand "is rather like making
crucial to the lawfulness of the United States Army record 'evidence' that
its purpose is to do battle."'53 In choosing both a soccer metaphor and an
Army simile to make his points, Scalia reinforces his arguments regarding
the "diversity contributions" ofVM's all-male environment with rhetorical
figures that convey a vigorous, martial flavor.
54
These rhetorical figures also reflect the condescending, mocking tone
that Scalia uses elsewhere in his dissent. He uses other figures to accuse the
Court of cheating ("load[ing] the dice"), 55 child's play ("Supreme Court
peek-a-boo"), 5 6 amateurism ("do-it-yourself... factfinding"),' bait and
150 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 206 (emphasis added).
'513 CICERO, DE ORATORE, supra note 110, at 125 (Readers respond favorably
to metaphors because their "thoughts are led to something else and yet without
going astray, which is a very great pleasure." (emphasis added)); 3 QUINTILIAN,
supra note 62, at 213 ("rhetorical ornament[s] contribute not a little to the
furtherance of our case .... For when our audience find[s] it a pleasure to listen,
their attention and their readiness to believe what they hear are both alike
increased" (emphasis added)).
152 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 584 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'51 Id. at 593.
'
5 4 Id. Justice Scalia employs muscular metaphors in other dissents as well. In
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (an Establish-
ment Clause case), he accuses the majority of destroying a long-standing tradition
of nonsectarian prayer at graduation ceremonies with, "[a]s its instrument of
destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering, [with which] the Court invents
a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion."
15 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 574.
117 Id. at 589 n.5.
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switch tactics ("ad-hocery"),' 58 and criminal activity ("politics-smuggled-
into-law").'59 Although these and other rhetorical figures contribute
somewhat to Justice Scalia's logical points, their most important contribu-
tions arise from their capacity for subtly keeping readers emotionally
invested in the arguments. Each figure makes an incremental, almost
unnoticeable, addition to the emotional climate of Justice Scalia's
arguments.
G. Parallelism
Metaphors and similes are among the most noticeable rhetorical
devices in Justice Scalia's dissent, but other less noticeable devices also
make important contributions. Parallelism, for instance, which played an
important part in the exordium, frequently appears when Justice Scalia
wants to increase the emotional force of his argument.
He uses it to emphasize that the Court contradicted its own precedents
when it concluded that Virginia has not provided an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for VMI's male-only admission standard. 60
Relying on a series of parallel predicate phrases, he says that the Court's
conclusion "can only be achieved.., if there are some women interested
in attending VMI, capable of undertaking its activities, and able to meet its
physical demands."'' Each of these phrases isolates a substantive point for
separate consideration while simultaneously increasing the oratorical
impact of the sentence.
Elsewhere, he asserts that by tailoring its educational objectives to meet
the Court's requirements, VMI will always be vulnerable to an Equal
Protection violation:
[I]f it restricts to men even one means by which it pursues that objec-
tive-no matter how few women are interested in pursuing the objective
by that means, no matter how much the single-sex program will have to
be changed it both sexes are admitted, and no matter how beneficial that
program has theretofore been to its participants.' 62
The parallel "no matter how" phrases punctuate and gradually increase the
emotional force of the sentence even as they itemize Justice Scalia's
'5s Id. at 600.
'59 Id. at 569.
'1o Id. at 572.
161 Id. at 572.
' 62 Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
substantive points. In this way, he relies on the phrasal cadences produced
by parallelism to intensify and provide coherence to his arguments.
H. Antithesis
As was pointed out earlier, classical rhetoricians saw strong connec-
tions between parallelism and another syntactical device, antithesis.
Aristotle was especially fond of antithesis as a method for making
arguments felt, as well as understood, stating that:
When the style is... antithetical, in each of the two members... an
opposite is balanced by an opposite.... 'By nature citizens, by law bereft
of their city' .... This kind of style is pleasing, because things are best
known by opposition, and are all the better known when the opposites are
put side by side; and is pleasing also because of its resemblance to
logio-for the method of refutation ... is the juxtaposition of contrary
conclusions. 163
Aristotle, like other Greco-Roman rhetoricians, thought that juxtaposing
contrasting ideas brought them into sharper relief, thereby making them
more comprehensible."
Not only that, antithesis brings with it an aesthetic pleasure that
redounds to the credit of the advocate. Aristotle also valued antithesis for
its concision, "the more concise and antithetical the saying, the better it
pleases, for the reason that, by the contrast, one learns the more, and, by the
conciseness, learns with the greater speed."'65
At critical junctures in his dissent, Scalia employs antithesis, often in
parallel form, for rhetorical effect. As he begins his criticism of Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence, Scalia uses antithesis to assert that it (the
concurrence) "finds VI unconstitutional on a basis that is more moderate
than the Court's but only at the expense of being even more implausible."'"
With parallel phrases, Scalia grudgingly concedes that the concurrence is
"more moderate"' 67 than the majority opinion, but then quickly qualifies
163 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 204-05 (emphasis added).
4 See, e.g., CICERO, ToPICA 413,415 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949); 3 QUINTILIAN,
supra note 62, at 325, 439, 441; 1 AD C. HERENNIUM, supra note 118, at 381,
383.
165 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 214.
'6 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
167 1d.
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that point by claiming it is "more implausible."1 6 With one phrase he offers
a compliment, with the other he withdraws it.
Elsewhere, he uses antithesis to repeat his argument that the Court
applies the Equal Protection standards inconsistently: "The only hope for
state-assisted single-sex private schools is that the Court will not apply in
the future the principles of law it has applied today. That is a substantial
hope, I am happy and ashamedto say."' 16 That is, he is happy that the Court
will not apply the legal principles, but ashamed at the Court's inconsis-
tency. The antithetical elements in both these examples sharply juxtapose
Scalia's substantive points with the concision and wit that classical
rhetoricians considered persuasive.
I. Rhetorical Questions
One of Justice Scalia's favorite figurative devices is the rhetorical
question. Here, too, he employs a device that attracted considerable
attention from classical rhetoricians who recommended it highly. Like other
figurative devices, rhetorical questions "serve to increase the force and
cogency ofproof."' Quintilian subdivides rhetorical questions into several
categories: those that emphasize a point, those that criticize a person, those
that embarrass others, those that reflect indignation, and those that express
wonder. 7 ' In other words, rhetorical questions are emotional arguments,
not disinterested inquiries, and are intended to stir both emotion and
thought. More than half of Quintilian's list is devoted to emotion-inducing
questions that "embarrass," "reflect indignation," and "express wonder."'
' 2
Justice Scalia also plays on the audience's emotions as he intersperses
rhetorical questions of various kinds throughout his dissent. He criticizes
the Court for failing to see that VMI's "mission" of "learning, leadership,
and patriotism" resembles the "mission" of all Virginia's colleges.' In
doing so, he asks "[w]hich of them (other colleges) would the Old
Dominion continue to fund if they did not aim to create individuals 'imbued
with love of learning, etc.,' right down to being ready 'to defend their
country in time of national peril'? '"'74 He also uses a rhetorical question to
criticize Justice Rehnquist's concurrence for failing to see that VMI's
168Id.
69 Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
170 3 QUINRILIAN, supra note 62, at 377.
17'Id. at 379, 381.
172 Id.
'7 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1
74 Id.
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"mission" is related to Virginia's diversity goals: "What other purpose
would the Commonwealth have?"']
75
Near the end of his dissent, Justice Scalia uses a pair of rhetorical
questions to emphasize the Court's inconsistent application of legal
principles: "After all, did not the Court today abandon the principles of law
it has applied in our earlier sex-classification cases? And does not the Court
positively invite private colleges to rely upon our ad-hocery by assuring
them this [case] is 'unique'?"' 76 Justice Scalia's "ad-hocery" coinage, while
calling attention to itself, also expresses his indignation at the Court's
failure to follow its own legal principles. As with the other rhetorical
devices he employs, Justice Scalia uses rhetorical questions to deepen the
emotional impact of his logical points.
By linking as he does the emotional resonances of the case with the
logical cross-currents of his arguments, Justice Scalia demonstrates his
sophistication as a stylist and his skill an advocate. As the forgoing analysis
shows, Justice Scalia uses a variety of rhetorical techniques to attract and
maintain the attention of his readers and to engage their emotions. To tap
into his audience's emotions, he does not rely primarily on the emotion-
generating words and phrases that opened this essay. Instead, he uses less
noticeable, but classically endorsed, rhetorical ploys.
That is, he carefully controls the emotional content of his opening and
closing paragraphs to create a sympathetic climate for his arguments and
to conclude in a memorable fashion. He carefully calibrates the emotional
force of metaphors and similes and places them at critical junctures.
Further, he adds still more emotional impact to his arguments by interspers-
ing sentence-level devices such as parallelism, antithesis, and rhetorical
questions throughout his dissent. By turns, he provokes anger, outrage,
dismay, indignation, shame, and, finally, regret, and does so in ways that
were recognized and recommended by classical rhetoricians from Aristotle
to Quintilian. Like any good advocate, Justice Scalia deliberately stirs these
emotions in his audience with the hope they will be more receptive to his
legal arguments. In the main, he succeeds, at least on the level of recogniz-
ing and exploiting the emotional content of the case.
IV. ETHOS AND ARGUMENT
Scalia is less successful, however, in maintaining the proper ethos. For
classical rhetoricians, ethos was as important as logos or pathos in
successful advocacy. Aristotle insisted that:
"I Id. at 592.
176Id. at 600.
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[T]he speaker must not merely see to it that his [argument] ... shall be
convincing and persuasive, but he must... give the right impression of
himself.... This is true above all in deliberative speaking...; for in
conducing to persuasion it is highly important that the speaker should
evince a certain character, and that the judges should conceive him to be
disposed towards them in a certain way ....177
Advocates can create a good impression, according to Aristotle, by
several means: "[T]here are three things that gain our belief, namely,
intelligence, character, and good will.'' 17' Aristotle also pointed out the
necessity of connecting the emotional content of arguments (pathos) with
ethos: "[Y]ou may use each and all of these means [of emotional argu-
ments] ... with a view to making your audience receptive, and withal give
an impression of yourself as a good and just man, for good character
always commands more attention.'1 79
Like Aristotle, Cicero was convinced that an advocate's ethos played
a critical part in the success of his arguments. While Cicero agrees with
Aristotle that projecting intelligence and good character are important, he
focuses on other qualities as well:
[A]ttributes useful in an advocate are a mild tone, a countenance
expressive of modesty, gentle language .... It is very helpful to display
the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty and a disposition
that ispleasing.., and all the qualities belonging to men who are upright,
unassuming and not given to haste, stubbornness, strife or harshness
180
Cicero repeatedly insists that a low-key approach, demonstrating the
advocate's good nature, calmness, and loyalty are crucial to successful
advocacy. Elsewhere, he connects these personal attributes to rhetorical
style by observing that "by means of particular types of thought and
diction, and the employment besides of a delivery that is unruffled and
17 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 91 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
'79 Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added). For modem recognition of this point, see
Frost, Ethos, Pathos & LegalAudience, supra note 9, at 104-07; Posner, supra note
49, at 1436 n.33 ("The creation of the implied author corresponds to the ethical
appeal in classical rhetoric--that is, to the devices by which a speaker tries to
convince his audience that he is the kind of person who is worthy of belief."
(emphasis added)).
10 3 CICERO, DE ORATORE, supra note 110, at 327, 329 (emphasis added).
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eloquent of good-nature, the speaker... [is] made to appear upright, well-
bred and virtuous.''.
Like Aristotle, Quintilian sees a close connection between pathos and
ethos. In some senses, "pathos and ethos are sometimes of the same nature.
.. 1.82 He adds that "sometimes however they differ, a distinction which
is important for the peroration, since ethos is generally employed to calm
the storm aroused bypathos."'8 3 Quintilian also insists that advocates avoid
"the impression that [they] are abusive, malignant, proud or slanderous
toward any individual or body of men, especially such as cannot be hurt
without exciting the disapproval of the judge [or audience]."'
Above all, Quintilian regarded rhetoric as the art of a good man
speaking:
Finally ethos in all its forms requires the speaker to be a man of good
character and courtesy. For it is most important that he should himself
possess or be thought to possess those virtues for the possession of which
it is his duty, if possible, to commend his client as well, While the
excellence of his own character will make his pleading all the more
convincing and will be of the utmost service to the cases which he
undertakes. "5
As these quotations illustrate, classical rhetoricians had a highly
developed sense of how an advocate's character and demeanor affect an
audience's response to arguments. Intelligence is important, of course, but
other characteristics are more important. All of them agree that an advocate
must demonstrate good will, modesty, calmness, and loyalty, in part
because these attributes help calm the emotional turmoil created by the
pathos of the case.
To create the proper ethos, they recommend that advocates use gentle
language, and adopt a mild tone. Finally, to avoid exciting the disapproval
181 Id. at 329 (emphasis added). As one of the most famous and successful
advocates of his day, however, Cicero was well aware that it is sometimes
necessary to address audiences "in quite another way, [which] excites and urges the
feelings of the tribunal towards hatred or love, ill-will or well-wishing, fear or
hope, desire or aversion." Id. at 331. That is, depending on the audience, advocates
may need to abandon the low-key approach in favor of a more aggressive,
confrontational stance.
"12 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 423.
183 Id. (second emphasis added).
184 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
I8 5 Id. at 427.
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of their audiences, advocates must not be abusive, malignant, or slanderous.
This advice regarding civility is echoed in VMI's "The Code of the
Gentleman," which insists that a gentleman "[d]oes not lose his temper; nor
exhibit anger, fear, hate, embarrassment, ardor or hilarity in public."'86
Justice Scalia professedly admires the Code, but seems to have forgotten
this particular admonition while writing his dissent. Although his dissents
are obviously a very "public" forum, he nevertheless exhibits anger, ardor,
and hilarity, thereby departing not only from the Greco-Roman standard,
but also from "The Code of the Gentleman."
Because Justice Scalia miscalculates the negative impact of several
different rhetorical devices, the ethos he projects in his dissent frequently
falls short of the classical ideal. His word choices are questionable, his
claims are hyperbolic, and his irony is mean-spirited. Of the three, his word
choices are the easiest to detect. They are also Scalia's stylistic feature that
attracts the most critical attention.'87
A. Word Choice
According to classical rhetoricians, word choices, like other aspects of
rhetoric, reveal the true character of the advocate. Rhetoricians admired a
simple style and were skeptical of any stylistic mannerism that called
attention to itself. Aristotle says that "[n]aturalness is persuasive, artifice
is just the reverse. People grow suspicious of an artificial speaker, and
think he has designs upon them."' 88 Quintilian observed that:
[T]hose words are best which are least far-fetched and give the impression
of simplicity and reality. For those words which are obviously the result
of careful search and even seem to parade their self-conscious art, fail to
attain the grace at which they aim and lose all appearance of sincerity
189
Several of Justice Scalia's words and phrases obviously fall in the
category of "artificial." Among the more noticeable ones are: "ad-
hocery,"'9 ° "do-it-yourself... factfinding,"'' and "Supreme Court peek-a-
186 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 602 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
'8' See, e.g., Fajans &Falk, supra note 33.
188 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 186 (emphasis added).
189 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 189 (emphasis added).
9 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'o' Id. at 589 n.5.
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boo."'' These, and other words and phrases, are obviously the self-
conscious result of careful search and, according to both Aristotle and
Quintilian, make audiences suspicious of their author's sincerity.
While Scalia's word choices do. call attention to themselves, they
probably do the least damage to Scalia's ethos. Because they are so
obviously biased, readers are forearmed against their impact. Even so,
because they are so slangy and colloquial, they seem to reflect a contempt
for the Court's deliberative processes.
Justice Scalia also employs this slangy vocabulary elsewhere. When
criticizing the Court's lack of clear standards of review he asserts, "[w]e
have no established criterion for 'intermediate scrutiny' either, but
essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice."'93 He
uses this vocabulary when claiming the Court offers false hope regarding
its future sex classification cases, stating that "the Court creates the illusion
that government officials ... will have a clear shot at justifying some sort
of single-sex public education."' 94 Like the aforementioned patently
"artificial" words and phrases, these colloquialisms call as much attention
to themselves as they do to Scalia's arguments and for that reason are
rhetorically suspect. 9
In sum, Scalia's conversational, slangy diction level lacks the "propri-
ety" befitting the dignity of the court. Any lawyer who used such language
in a brief or in oral argument would undoubtedly alienate his audience, in
part because it appears to be gratuitous and unprofessional.
Justice Scalia is far too skilled a rhetorician to rely solely on such
heavy-handed word choices. He also uses subtle word choices that are
likely to escape the audience's notice. For example, he repeatedly uses the
verb "enshrine" to subtly criticize the Court on several different fronts.
First, he claims the Court "enshrines the notion that no substantial
educational value is to be served by an all-men's military academy."'96
'92 Id. at 574.
'93 Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
194 Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
195 Justice Scalia's fondness for "artificial" coinages and slangy phrasings is
evident in other dissents. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-32 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits
invocations and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies, the
Court-with nary a mention that it is doing so-lays waste a tradition that is as old
as public school graduation ceremonies ..... (emphasis added)). Elsewhere in this
dissent, Scalia asserts that the majority opinion is based on a "psycho-journey"
which results in a "psycho-coercion" test. Id. at 643-44.
19"6 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
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Then, he faults the Court for its mistaken assumption that VMI's 1839
educational policy "had been enshrined and remained enshrined...
pronouncing that the institution's purpose is to keep women in their
place.' ' 97 Worst of all, he asserts, "[t]he enemies of single-sex education
have won; ... their view of the world is enshrined in the Constitution."' 9'
Playing on the religious connotations of the word, Scalia subtly emphasizes
his fear that the wrong ideas have been "enshrined" and does so in a way
that focuses on the ideas, not on the advocate. Had Scalia relied more
heavily on subtleties of this sort in his word choices, he would have
attracted fewer suspicions of judicial partisanship and would have
preserved the proper judicial ethos.'99
B. Hyperbole
Justice Scalia also compromises his judicial ethos with his noticeable
penchant for hyperbole. Although his substantive concerns may be
justified, he overstates them in ways that make audiences suspicious.
Aristotle cautiously approved of the use of hyperbole to add liveliness to
arguments but, he noted, "[h]yperboles are characteristic of youngsters;
they betray vehemence. And so they are used, above all, by men in an angry
passion."2 ° Quintilian too finds that hyperbole is useful, but also includes
it in among the "causes of the decline of oratory." '' He says that misuse of
hyperbole arises from a failure to observe a sense of proportion, "[w]e must
therefore be all the more careful to consider how far we may go in
exaggerating facts which our audience may refuse to believe."20 2
Justice Scalia employs hyperbole at several critical junctures in his
dissent, the most important being his opening paragraph.203 In that
197 Id. at 581 (second emphasis added).
'9 Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
'99 In response to this last assertion, my colleague, and constitutional law
scholar, Professor James Kushner, observed, "Perhaps, but there is always the
possibility that he is so wrong substantively that his prose hardly loses any-
thing--indeed, it endears him to some and amuses others."
200 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 216 (emphasis added).
201 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 345.
221Id. at 343.
203 Scalia writes:
Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the.
Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century
and a half. To achieve that desired result, it rejects (contrary to our
established practice) the factual findings .... sweeps aside the precedents
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paragraph, he exaggerates the impact the Court's decision will have, and
the processes whereby it reached that decision.2" 4 Justice Scalia's claims
notwithstanding, the Court's decision did not shut down VMI, it did not
reject all the lower courts' findings, nor did it sweep aside its precedents or
ignore history.
Instead, the Court simply reached a result with which Scalia disagreed.
While Scalia's hyperbole in the exordium (introduction) may be a
rhetorically justifiable attempt to engage the interest and emotions of the
audience, his use of it elsewhere in the dissent is less defensible. There, his
exaggerations seem to reflect the "vehemence" and "anger" that Aristotle
and others found damaging to an advocate's ethos.2°5 For example, at
various points in his dissent, Scalia accuses the Court of feeling "free to
evaluate everything under the sun by applying one of three tests, '2 6 of
varying its standard of review "whenever [it] feel[s] like it, '2°7 and of
"destroy[ing] VNI.' 2°8 Of these three examples, the first two are the most
damaging to Scalia's ethos. With them, he impugns the very Court
processes he and the other justices are sworn to uphold and, in doing so,
violates the classical admonition that advocates avoid being "abusive" or
"slanderous toward any ... body of men. . .. "0 To suggest that his
colleagues are unprincipled, instead of just mistaken, exceeds the bounds
of judicial propriety and good taste.
C. Irony
From the standpoint of ethos, the most corrosive rhetorical device
Scalia employs is irony. In a variety of ways, he uses irony as a sort of
of the Court, and ignores the history of our people. As to facts: It explicitly
rejects the finding that there exist "gender-based developmental differ-
ences" supporting Virginia's restriction of the "adversative" method to only
a men's institution, and the finding that the all-male composition of the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is essential to that institution's character.
As to precedent: It drastically revises our established standards for
reviewing sex-based classifications. And, as to history: It counts for nothing
the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men's military colleges
supported by both States and the Federal Government.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).204 Id.
205 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 216.
206 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 568.
208 Id. at 599.
209 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 11.
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running commentary throughout his dissent in ways that display not just
his disagreement with the Court's result, but also his apparent contempt
for the Court as an institution and the reasoning and motives of his
colleagues.
Classical rhetoricians admired irony as a rhetorical device primarily
because of its ability to engage the audience's interest. They thought that
by inviting audiences to "understand something which is the opposite of
what is actually said,"2 ' advocates require them to be more than passive
participants. However, as Aristotle pointed out, irony frequently
"implies contempt" for its target."' Moreover, while Aristotle observed that
irony "befit[s] a gentleman,"2"2 he adds that, to be most effective, "[t]he
jests of the ironical man are at his own expense," not at the expense of
others.
2" 3
Quintilian distinguished several different types of irony based on the
advocate's pretenses: pretending to be lost in wonder at the wisdom of
others, pretending to own faults they do not have, pretending to concede to
opponents qualities they do not have, etc.2"4 Justice Scalia employs these
and other types of irony, but does so in a fashion that is so sarcastic that it
compromises his ethos and thereby damages his arguments.
Not all of Justice Scalia's irony has the harsh tone that adversely
affects his ethos. For example, he justifies his dissent by observing that
"[s]ince it is entirely clear that the Constitution of the United States--the
old one--takes no sides in this educational debate, I dissent."2 5 Elsewhere,
he feigns confusion about how to answer his own rhetorical question
concerning why Virginia should be blamed for treating VMI just as it does
other public schools by stating "[tihis is a great puzzlement., 216 He also
subtly mocks the Court's perceptions of "VMI [as] a uniquely prestigious
all-male institution, conceived in chauvinism, etc., etc."2 7 Tempered in tone
and quietly witty, these ironical asides would have little damaging effect on
Scalia's ethos were it not for the fact they are coupled with harsher, more
intemperate sallies in which his irony becomes sarcastic.
210 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 401.
21 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, at 98.
212 Id. at 240.
213 Id. (emphasis added).
214 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 401, 403.
215 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).2 6 Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
217Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
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When accusing the Court of misleadingly describing its previous sex-
classification cases,"' Scalia's sarcasm is patent:
The wonderful thing about these statements is that they are not actually
false--just as it would not be actually false to say that "our cases have
thus far reserved the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of proof for
criminal cases," or that "we have not equated tort actions, for all purposes
to criminal prosecutions. 219
Elsewhere, he is equally sarcastic when he criticizes the Court's
dismissal of the District Court's evidentiary findings by observing, "[h]ow
remarkable to criticize the District Court on the ground that itsfindings rest
on the evidence., 2 °0 Shortly thereafter, he adds that the Court's misguided
dismissal of the District Court findings "makes evident that the parties to
this [case] could have saved themselves a great deal of time, trouble, and
expense by omitiing a trial.2 2' As he concludes his dissent, Scalia repeats
his accusation that the "self-righteous Supreme Court" has created an
unworkable standard of review while "acting on its Members' personal
view of what would make a 'more perfect Union,' (a criterion only slightly
more restrictive than a 'more perfect world' ).
' 222
The sarcastic tone of these criticisms is magnified when it is coupled
with the milder ironical comments. As Justice Scalia' s ironical commentary
periodically interrupts his substantive criticisms, the tone of the dissent
becomes increasingly sarcastic. This sarcasm, more than any other
rhetorical device he employs (except perhaps the name-calling), damages
Justice Scalia's ethos, and with it, the persuasive impact of his arguments.
Instead of projecting a positive ethos by evincing loyalty (to the Court
as an institution), calmness (in making his points), good will (to his
2Id. at 574 (" 'The Court has,' it says, 'thus far reserved most stringent
judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin .. . ' and it
describes. . earlier cases as having done no more than decline to 'equate gender
classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national
origin'." (citations omitted)). Id. at 574.219 Id. (emphasis added).
220 Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
22 Id. (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (an Establishment Clause case)
("Another happy aspect of the case is that it is only a jurisprudential disaster and
not a practical one." (emphasis added)).
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opponents), and a seemly modesty, Justice Scalia has created a negative
ethos comprised of disloyalty (to the Court as an institution), pride (in his
own reasoning), intemperance (in his language), and abuse (of his
colleagues). In doing so, he ignores or misuses one of the most potent
rhetorical tools available to an advocate-his credibility, or ethos.
V. CONCLUSION
In his discussion of "style" in judicial opinions, Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit offers several definitions of style, including the following:
"'style' is what is left out by paraphrase." '223 He adds that:
Some judicial opinions-those written by the masters-would lose
something, and maybe a lot, in being paraphrased. But their essential
meaning would not be lost. Even the best, the most distinctive, the most
eloquent judicial opinion could be rewritten in a very different style and
yet convey enough of the meaning of the original to be considered a close
substitute for it.
224
Because Judge Posner focuses primarily on the logos, or logic, of an
opinion, his point regarding paraphrase is an insightful, but incomplete,
definition of rhetorical style. "Style" in the Greco-Roman sense encom-
passes more than what is paraphrasable. As Judge Posner observes
elsewhere, style also "establish[es] a mood and perhaps a sense of the
writer's personality."22
Justice Scalia's arguments are certainly paraphrasable, as the summary
earlier in this Article shows.226 But a paraphrase cannot duplicate the
emotional force of Justice Scalia's arguments, or the "sense of the writer's
personality" that pervades them. For that reason a paraphrase, no matter
how complete or exact, is potentially misleading because it eliminates
Justice Scalia' s "style." Both the emotional force (pathos) and the "writer's
personality" (ethos) are as important as logic (logos) in making Justice
Scalia's arguments successful. To convince those who have not already
made up their minds regarding VMI's male-only admission policy, Justice
Scalia must engage their emotions and convince them that he is, in
223 Posner, supra note 49, at 1422.
22 Id. at 1423 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
225 Id. at 1422.
226 See supra Part ll.B.
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Quintilian's phrase, "'a good man, skilled in speaking."' 27 Unfortunately
for his arguments, Justice Scalia's dissent only partly succeeds as an
example of effective advocacy. While he does succeed in arousing readers'
emotions, he consistently squanders his emotional capital with gratuitous
attacks that compromise his credibility.
While this conclusion regarding Justice Scalia's effectiveness is
certainly debatable, the 2500 year-old analytical technique whereby it was
reached is not. Moreover, given its exhaustive attention to rhetorical detail,
this technique can be profitably applied to almost all legal discourse. As the
history of legal analysis demonstrates, insights into legal discourse
sometimes come from unexpected and nontraditional sources, usually
bringing with them a deeper understanding of how that discourse succeeds
or fails. Analyzing modem legal discourse using the tools created by
Greco-Roman rhetoricians can add invaluable perspectives not only on
judicial opinions, but on all forms of legal discourse.
227 4 QUINTILIAN, supra note 62, at 355.
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